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WIIlCH QUEUE?
Robert J. Sternberg*

and Elena L. Grigorenko**
JUMPING THE QUEUE: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGAL TREATMENT
OF STUDENTS WITH LEARNING DISABILITIES. By Mark Kelman and
Gillian Lester. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Pp. xi, 313.
$39.95.
It is annoying when one is in a long line - at a ticket counter, at
a supermarket, at a bank - and someone "jumps the queue," tak
ing a position in line ahead of other people who lined up first. The
title of Mark Kelman1 and Gillian Lester's2 book, Jumping the
Queue, gives the reader advance warning of the authors' position
on people who edge ahead in line. But the topic of their book is not
ticket, supermarket, or bank lines, but rather the line to enjoy the
benefits of society. And the focus of the analysis of queue-jumpers
is not on customers in the commercial marketplace, but on a partic
ular group of students in the academic marketplace. These students
are ones who have been identified as having learning disabilities.
Kelman and Lester's book covers diverse topics in its eight
chapters totaling 313 pages, including technical controversies (pp.
17-36), the federal regulatory framework (pp. 37-66), local practice
(including diagnosis and placement) (pp. 67-92), resource manage
ment and discipline (pp. 93-116), extra resources for the classroom
teacher (pp. 117-60), accommodation on law school exams (pp. 16194), and ideology and entitlement (pp. 195-226). There are many
points of view from which learning disabilities can be approached,
and the authors' point of view, indicated by the subtitle, "an inquiry
into the legal treatment of students with learning disabilities." The
subtitle is appropriate; the book reads more as an inquiry than as a
* IBM Professor of Psychology and Education in the Department of Psychology, Yale
University. Ph.D. 1975, Stanford University. - Ed. Preparation of this Review was
supported by Grants R206R950001 and R206A70001 from the U.S. Office of Educational
Research and Improvement under the Javits Act. Financial support for this research does
not necessarily indicate agreement with the positions taken in this review either by the U.S.
Department of Education or the U.S. Government. Parts of this review draw on R.J.
STERNBERG & E.L. GRIGORENKO, OUR LABELED CHILDREN: WHAT EVERY PARENT AND
TEACHER NEEDS TO KNow ABOUT LEARNING DISABILITIES {1999).
** Research Scientist in the Department of Psychology and Child Study Center, Yale
University, and Associate Professor of Psychology, Moscow State University. Ph.D. 1996,
Yale University. - Ed.
1. William Nelson Cromwell Professor of Law, Stanford Law School.
2. Acting Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.
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presentation of a strong stand regarding what needs to be done,
legally or otherwise. At times, the authors' unwillingness to take
strong or even clearcut stands is frustrating.3 Conclusions often get
lost in what, for two reviewers who are psychologists, appear to be
technical legal thickets.4 But it is clear that Kelman and Lester are
skeptical of the preferential treatment given to those identified with
learning disabilities, because they point out - correctly, we believe
- that the accommodations that benefit individuals identified as
having learning disabilities would benefit virtually anyone (pp. 17273). The authors also express skepticism of whether the system is
just, granting as it does special legal privileges to those who have no
unique moral, psychological, or educational claim to these privi
leges (Chapter 8).
Because the book is an examination primarily of legal issues, it
addresses somewhat superficially what we believe to be the most
fundamental problem pertaining to learning disabilities. This prob
lem is that the concept as it is used in practice is invalid. We have
no doubt that the concept of a learning disability is, in theory, verid
ical. But there is a big gap between theory and practice. We seek
in this review to deal with this issue, because it renders the societal
legal discussion moot. The laws cannot be just if they are based on
a classificatory system that makes little or no psychological or edu
cational sense. The book also may make a false assumption in
assuming there is a single queue. Neither success, nor abilities, nor
practically anything else that really matters in life is unidimensional.
Learning disabilities certainly are not.
I.

DEFINING A LEARNING DISABILITY

Specific learning disabilities have been defined in a number of
different ways. A consensus view has emerged that is expressed in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth
Edition (DSM-IV) of the American Psychiatric Association (APA)
3. For example, the authors state that "The basic claim that we will elaborate over the
course of the book is straightforward: as a society, we must make decisions about which
students deserve resources beyond those devoted to their classmates." P. 6. The authors
then go on to state the many other decisions society must make. Many readers may want
more guidance not only as to what decisions need to be made, but as to what these decisions
should be and why. As another example, the authors state that they are quite critical of
existing legislation "but offer no real insight into the question of whether a system that would
in fact be likely to replace it if it eroded would be preferable to the current system." P. 9.
But this is the insight many readers would hope the authors of the book would offer: What
should society legislate and would the new legislation improve on what we have?
4. For example, the authors present a lengthy discussion of alternative interpretations
that might be given to the major Supreme Court case, Board of Education v. Rowley, 458
U.S. 176 (1982). Pp. 51-55. Many readers, though, would welcome the opportunity to hear
what the authors believe to be an optimal interpretation, and why they believe it. Readers
might also wonder about the authors' opinion of how the law should be implemented in
schools.
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according to which learning disabilities (referred to as "learning dis
orders" in DSM-IV) are marked impairments in the development
of specific skills, such as reading skills, relative to the level of skills
expected on the basis of an individual's age, education, and intelli
gence.5 The term for this is "differential" skills. These impairments
interfere with daily life and academic achievement. They are not
due, however, to physical deficits, such as visual or hearing deficits,
or to acquired neurological conditions, such as those caused by
brain trauma. Learning disabilities seldom can be diagnosed before
the end of kindergarten or the beginning of first grade. In practice,
these disabilities tend to be identified on the basis of differences in
performance on tests of abilities and tests of achievement.
In its effort to categorize students and define recipients of bene
fits, both the law and Jumping the Queue take for granted the
validity of this definition and method of detecting learning disabili
ties. The thesis for this review is that this assumption is incorrect on
its face. We view learning disabilities in a way that is somewhat
contrary to this kind of standard definition. Our thesis is that virtu

ally everyone has some kind of learning disability but that society
only chooses to recognize some individuals as such. Whether some
one is labeled as learning disabled in many respects resembles the
result of a lottery. 6 Here's why.
All reputable theorists of abilities agree that abilities are multi
ple - that there are many of them.7 Even Charles Spearman, the
father of the theory of general ability, stated that in addition to a
general ability that applies to all tasks there are specific abilities
that apply to specific tasks.8 No serious psychological theorist, to
our knowledge, has claimed that there is only one kind of ability.
Although theorists may disagree as to exactly what the abilities are
or how they are structured, they agree that the abilities are distin
guishable from each other. For example, the skills that constitute
reading ability are different from the skills that constitute mathe
matical ability, which are in turn different from the skills that con
stitute musical ability.9 Thus, someone could be an able reader but
a poor musician, or vice-versa. Perhaps not in school, but almost
5. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 46-53 (4th ed. 1994).
6. See generally R.J. STERNBERG & E.L. GRIGORENKO, OUR LABELED CHILDREN:
WHAT EVERY PARENT AND TEACHER NEEDS TO KNow ABoUT LEARNING D1sABILmES
(1999).
7. See ROBERT J. STERNBERG, METAPHORS OF MIND: CONCEPTIONS OF THE NATURE OF
INTELLIGENCE 33-49 (1990).
8. See CHARLES SPEARMAN, THE AB1LmES OF MAN 75 (1927) (discussing the "specific
factor," which varies between different abilities).
9. See, e.g., HowARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE INTELLI·
GENCES passim (1983).
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certainly later in life, the person who seeks a career that uses math
ematics heavily will be standing in a different queue from the per
son who uses music heavily.
Because abilities are multiple, it is odd that the operational defi
nition of learning disabilities so often relies on the measurement of
IQ. The use of a single quantity for an IQ implies a unitary basis
for intelligence that does not exist in psychological theory and is
extremely unlikely to exist in reality.

If one were to make a list of the many abilities people can have,
one would find that virtually no one is proficient in all the skills
constituting all of these abilities. At the same time, virtually no one
is hopelessly inept in all of these skills. Rather, almost everyone is
more proficient than are other people in some skills and less profi
cient in other skills. Some people may be proficient in more skills,
or more proficient in certain skills, but virtually everyone shows a
pattern of multiple strengths and multiple weaknesses.
Put another way, virtually everyone shows a complex pattern of
abilities and disabilities. For example, even the straight-A student
in school may be inept in certain aspects of interpersonal relations.
Even the straight-F student in school may be able in many aspects
of dealing with other people. This intuition is captured in modem
theories of intelligence, which argue on the basis of plentiful and
diverse data that interpersonal and practical skills actually are dis
tinct from traditional academic skills. High levels of these different
kinds of skills may or may not be found in the same persons.
Given that everyone has a pattern of abilities and disabilities,
how does it happen that some people get labeled as having learning
disabilities whereas other people do not? The reason is that label

ing of someone as having a learning disability is the result of an inter
action between the individual and the society. Leaming disability
resides neither totally in the individual nor totally in the society. It
is not simply a matter of having a certain set of genes nor is it sim
ply a matter of society's defining someone who is perfectly adaptive
as having a disability. Rather, the society selects some people to
label as having learning disabilities and does not select others.
Our point of view differs from a common view, which is intrinsic
and states that learning abilities reside within the individual. Our
point of view also differs from the view that learning abilities are
extrinsic and reside solely in the labeling of society.10 We argue
that both of these views are untenable.
How does society decide whom to label? It decides on the basis
of the set of skills that it values in school and on the job. If society
10. For expositions of these alternative points of view, see PERSPECI1VES ON LEARNING
DISABILmES: BIOLOGICAL, COGNITIVE, CoNTEXTUAL 193-249 (Robert J. Sternberg &
Louise Spear-Swerling eds., 1999).
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views a certain set of skills (such as reading skills) as essential, and
views them as constituting a "specific" rather than a general ability,
then individuals with low levels of proficiency in these skills are la
beled as having a specific disability. One has a set of abilities and
disabilities and metaphorically enters a lottery that determines
whether the particular pattern will result in a learning disability la
bel. We are not saying that the labeling process is wholly arbitrary.
Rather, we are saying that there are many different possible label
ing processes that can yield totally different results. The discussion
in Jumping the Queue is based upon a common legal conception of
learning disability that is only one of many different conceptions a
society might have.

II.

DISABILITY AS A RELATIONSIIlP BETWEEN PERSON AND
ENVIRONMENT

Our society, through federal law as instantiated in the Individu
als with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA),11 currently recognizes
various types of learning disabilities: listening, speaking, basic read
ing skills, reading comprehension skills, written expression, arith
metic calculation skills, and mathematics reasoning skills.12 Many
other skills might be included on this list. For example, the list
might include spatial skills that are important in finding one's way
around a city, driving a car, or fitting suitcases into the trunk of a
car. It might include musical or artistic skills if the society valued
these highly enough to label those individuals whose levels of them
are distinctively low as having a disability. The list might include
creative skills if society believed that people who virtually never
have their own good novel ideas lack something important. Really,
the list might include any ability at all!
Leaming disabilities are viewed as specific. But in fact, there
are no completely general abilities or disabilities. For example, IQ
tests are sometimes seen as measuring "general ability," but in fact,
a high score on an IQ test is no guarantee of a high level of creative
ability, practical or common-sense ability, athletic ability, musical
ability, or any of a number of other abilities. So all abilities and
disabilities are specific in greater or lesser degree.
Where and when an individual is born have a tremendous
impact on whether that individual will be labeled as having a learn
ing disability. In a preliterate society, for example, there are no
individuals labeled as having a reading disability. In such a society,
a man lacking the spatial or athletic skills to be a good hunter might
have a disability that genuinely could affect his ability to function
11. 20 u.s.c. § 1400 (1994).
12. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(15).
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well in that society. One society might label someone with minimal
musical skills as having a musical disability, whereas another society
might not. In effect, each individual becomes a mandatory partici
pant in a lottery that determines whether the particular pattern of
abilities and disabilities he or she has will lead to the individual's
being labeled as having a learning disability. But the lottery applies
only to the labeling process. Everyone has a pattern of both abili
ties and disabilities. The lottery represents how society chooses to
label that pattern. Thus, each society does not merely have a differ
ent queue. It has different queues.
Given that all individuals have both strengths and weaknesses,
individuals labeled as having learning disabilities have many
sources of strength to offer society. But the society often inadver
tently positions these individuals to view themselves as potential
victims rather than as potential victors, a point we believe is consis
tent with the tenor of Kelman and Lester's book (pp. 225-26).
Indeed, Kelman and Lester state on the last page of text that it "will
always be tempting to 'jump the queue' by claiming that one's dis
tributive interests take priority over the interests of another group:
claim hopping on the (ideological) backs of instances of genuine
victimization . . . " (p. 226). In this regard, we have three main
contentions:
First, individuals with specific learning disabilities often have
considerable strengths in other abilities. Second, these individuals
should be encouraged to view themselves as victors who capitalize
on strengths instead of viewing themselves as victims of their disa
bilities and thereby adopting the mindset of people who are victim
ized. They should find paths in their lives that enable them to
capitalize on their strengths, not on their weaknesses.
Third, curriculum modifications that excuse these individuals
from learning important skills or from the normal experiences of
schooling may be well-intentioned, but can end up hurting these
individuals more than helping them. The reason is that for the soci
ety to have labeled the individuals as having a learning disability in
the first place, the ability for which they were labeled as lacking
(disabled) must be one that the society views as essential for adap
tive living in that society. The laws so carefully discussed in
Jumping the Queue apply only to societally recognized disabilities,
not to all possible disabilities. Indeed, as at the present time there
is a large degree of arbitrariness in what deficits are officially recog
nized as "disabilities," it would not even be feasible to cover all
possibilities. Where would the list end? Potentially, the list is end
less, as everyone is weak in at least some skills, including skills that
may be very specific, such as threading a needle or kicking a
football.
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It is wrong to write off individuals identified as having learning
disabilities. Ignoring such children or treating them as hopeless is
unfair and not in either the children's or society's best interest.
These individuals are far from hopeless, unless we steal their hope
from them. We believe that individuals with learning disabilities
should be helped to make the most of their potential.
We believe that individuals with learning disabilities often have
enormous strengths that the current system of education neither
taps nor even draws out. The special services that society provides
often do not fully help students with learning disabilities develop
their strengths or encourage them to use their strengths to learn.
Yet their learning disabilities may force them to develop strengths
that children who are not identified as having learning disabilities
have no incentive to develop.

In our view, the "learning disabled" or "LD" label can be costly
both to the individual and to society. Once children are labeled as
"LD," a complex set of mechanisms is put into effect that renders it
likely that the label will become a self-fulfilling prophecy, whether
it was originally correct or not. A well-intentioned labeling proce
dure thus can become harmful to our young.
As mentioned above, genuine LD is an interaction between the
individual and the environment. Certain biological predispositions
can put an individual at risk for the development of specific kinds of
learning disabilities. They do not determine whether the individual
will have a learning disability. Even among literate societies, some
orthographic (writing) systems impose challenges that others do not
impose, challenges that affect the probability of individuals mani
festing reading disabilities. For instance, Spanish is pronounced al
most exactly the same as it is written; English is not. Chinese uses a
logographic (picture-based) writing system, whereas Indo
European languages such as English, French, German, and Russian
use alphabetic writing systems. Whether a child becomes identified
as having a reading disability will be affected not only by that
child's biological makeup, but also by where and when the child
grows up. Simply speaking of "learning disability" or "reading disa
bility" is too simplistic to make sense.
Biological does not imply immutable. Even to the extent that
the origins of learning disabilities are biological, these biological
origins have nothing at all to do with whether the symptoms of
learning disabilities are modifiable. Put another way, the partially
biological origins of learning disabilities in no way preclude
successful educational interventions. "Biological" is in no way sy
nonymous with "fixed." For example, height is highly heritable, but
heights have increased over the years. Phenylketonuria is 100 per
cent heritable, but a diet free of phenylalanine can stave off mental
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retardation in affected children. Even IQ, which is heritable in
some degree, has been found to be rising about nine points per gen
eration during the years of the present century (when raw scores
[number correct] rather than scaled IQ scores are used).13
The remedies used to improve performance of individuals with
learning disabilities should always depend on the specific deficits
individuals experience, not on how these individuals are labeled.
Lumping together all of the labeled children into one global cate
gory such as LD, and then giving them what usually amounts to a
single form of remediation, may hurt a majority of the students and
help only a few.

III.

THE WRONG PATH

We know what to do; we do not do it. Cognitive theory pro
vides effective interventions for many of the conditions today
lumped together as "LD."14 Many schools make little or no use of
any of this knowledge. Why?
First, the :financial interests of the schools may drive labeling.
Schools regrettably can have a :financial interest - state and local
funding, often deriving from federal funding - in over
identification. When they are "paid by the head" for the identifica
tion of each child with an LD, they are obviously tempted to label
more children as having an LD.
Second, over-labeling children may take parental pressure off
school administrators. The school administrators no longer have to
deal with those parents who clamor to have their children labeled
as having an LD.
Third, labeling children as having an LD can provide a way of
coming closer to reaching the Holy Grail of improved test scores.
By giving children more time on tests and providing other accom
modations for test-taking such as special quiet rooms, administra
tors potentially can raise the test scores of children with learning
disabilities and thus raise the averages for their schools or districts.
The schools or districts thus look better and get paid extra federal
13. See THE RrsING CURVE: LoNG-TERM GAINS IN IQ AND RELATED MEASURES passim
(Ulric Neisser ed., 1998); James R. Flynn, Massive IQ Gains in 14 Nations: What IQ Tests
Really Measure, 101 PsYCHOL. BULL. 171, 171-91 (1987).
14. At least two interventions that have been successful, in our opinion, are Success for
All, devised by N.A. Madden, R.E. Slavin, and their associates, and the Bowman Gray
Learning Disabilities Project, devised by Rebecca Felton, Frank Wood, and their associates.
The first program is not targeted specifically at LD children; the second is. In the reading
domain, successful programs place a substantial emphasis on increasing phonemic awareness
and decoding skills. See LoursE SPEAR-SWERLING & ROBERT J. STERNBERG, OFF TRACK:
WHEN PooR READERS BECOME "LEARNING D1sABLED" 273-301, (1996); STERNBERG &
GruGORENKO supra note 5, at ch. 8.
,
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or state funds in the process. But their labeling signifies neither an
understanding of the problem nor an understanding of a solution.
Fourth, labeling is not tantamount to understanding. Unfortu
nately, people sometimes believe that they understand a phenome
non merely because they are able to assign a label to it. They then
fail to seek understanding of the phenomenon because they do not
know that they do not understand it. A teacher or administrator
may believe that the LD label is all that is needed to understand the
child's deficiencies and perhaps even to remediate them.
Fifth, much of the cognitive psychology literature has been com
municated in ways that are not fully comprehensible to educators
involved in the schooling of children with learning disabilities. As a
result, these educators could not make use of the findings, even if
they wanted to. There is a communication gap that will be filled
only when researchers better understand the problems of educators
and educators better understand the language of researchers.
Sixth, children with learning disabilities once were taught pri
marily by teachers with advanced training in special education. To
day, with the advent of full-inclusion models whereby most children
with learning disabilities are placed in regular classrooms, teaching
of these children is done much or all of the time by teachers with no
specialized training in how to deal with these children effectively.
As we have noted, one problem with the way learning disabili
ties are identified is the assumption that intelligence is a unitary
entity. Another problem is the use of discrepancy (difference)
scores.
Learning disabilities often are defined in terms of discrepancies
between IQ and a measure of a specific kind of learning ability. For
example, a child might be diagnosed with a reading disability if the
child scores much lower on standardized tests of reading ability
than on standardized tests of intelligence. On its face, this proce
dure would seem to make sense: the child is intelligent, but a poor
reader. What is wrong with such a sensible procedure for recogniz
ing the existence of learning disabilities?
We believe there are at least seven reasons why discrepancy
scores are invalid, regardless of their legal sanction.

1. The assumption that IQ tests measure all there is to intelligence
is extremely questionable. Many modern theorists question it.15 For
example, Sternberg has proposed a theory of successful intelligence,
according to which intelligence comprises three parts: analytical used in analyzing, judging, evaluating, and comparing; creative used in creating, inventing, discovering, and imagining; and practi15. See GARDNER, supra note 9, at 59-60; ROBERT J. STERNBERG, BEYOND IQ: A
TRIARCHIC THEORY OF HUMAN INTELLIGENCE 299-314 (1985).
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cal - used in putting into practice, applying, using, and implement
ing.16 IQ tests measure only a portion of the analytical abilities;
they typically measure creative and practical abilities either not at
all or hardly at all. So here, too, using an IQ test as a basis for
evaluating someone's intelligence will provide only a highly incom
plete measurement, at best. And as in Gardner's theory, to the
extent that reading involves analytical (or other) abilities, one is in
part subtracting a thing from itself.
In a number of studies, we and our colleagues have studied the
practical aspects of intelligence.17 For example, we have devised
tests of practical intelligence for business managers, salespeople,
college teachers, army leaders, and students. In study after study,
we have found that scores on tests of practical intelligence predict
real-world performance as well as or better than do IQ tests, but
that these tests of practical intelligence are not correlated with con
ventional IQ tests. In other words, one could not predict a person's
practical intelligence from his or her score on an IQ test, and vice
versa. If we had available only the modest IQ score, we might con
clude that someone is not very intelligent; in fact, that individual
might be high in practical intelligence, and thus have the ability to
excel in the everyday world. Or the person high in IQ might have
low practical intelligence. Should we refer to such an individual as
practically disabled? Once we expand our conception of intelli
gence, the disability notion becomes problematical.
In the U.S., we typically have found little or no relation between
IQ and practical, everyday intelligence.18 We found an even more
surprising result in a study we did in Kenya.19
Children near the village of Kisumu, Kenya are ill much of the
time. Parasitic infections that are not often found in the developed
world continually assault them. Remaining well is therefore an
essential aspect of practical intelligence.
Part of the indigenous education of such children is learning
about natural herbal medicines that the Kenyan villagers believe
fight parasitic infections. Village children may know the identities
of many such medicines, but children in the developed world, of
course, could not identify a single one.
We constructed a test of the practical intelligence of the village
children in which the children had to identify these medicines, as
16. See ROBERT J. STERNBERG, SUCCESSFUL INTELLIGENCE passim (1997).
17. See Robert J. Sternberg et al., The Relationship Between Academic and Practical In
telligence: A Case Study in Kenya Intelligence, in press [hereinafter Sternberg, Case Study];
Robert J. Sternberg et al., Testing Common Sense, 50 AM. PsYCHOLOGIST 912, 913-16 (1995)
[hereinafter Sternberg, Testing Common Sense].
18. See Sternberg, Testing Common Sense, supra note 17, at 923-24.
19. See Sternberg, Case Study, supra note 17.
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well as when and how to use them. This test thus measured implicit
knowledge that is considered important in the Kenyan village. We
correlated scores on our test of indigenous practical intelligence
with scores on two tests of vocabulary and with scores on a test of
abstract reasoning ability that consisted entirely of geometric
figures. The two vocabulary tests were in different languages: one
was in English, the language of the school; the other was in Dholuo,
the language of the Luo residents of the village. We found that
scores on the test of indigenous practical intelligence were signifi
cantly negatively correlated with scores on the test of vocabulary for
the language use in the school - English. In other words, the chil
dren who did better on the indigenous test actually did worse on the
Western types of tests. Scores on the indigenous intelligence test
were uncorrelated with scores on the vocabulary test in the Dholuo
language and with scores on the test of abstract reasoning ability.
Given this information, just how seriously can we take the
scores on the IQ tests, not only for certain Kenyan village children,
but for children from any subculture in the Western world that per
haps takes the kinds of skills measured by IQ tests less seriously
than does the mainstream U.S. culture? In the rural villages of
Kenya, many of the children are failing in school, and the parents
show little or no concern. They just do not value the types of skills
valued highly by Western education and plan to separate their chil
dren from these schools as soon as they are legally able to. They
value the skills that matter in the community, and they perceive the
training their children receive in school as largely irrelevant. If we
were to view one group as having a disability, would it be the chil
dren who do not have school-based knowledge, the children who do
not have community-based practical knowledge, both groups, or
perhaps some other group?
The Kenya study also has implications for our understanding of
verbal disabilities. Do we judge such disabilities from the stand
point of academic vocabulary and its use or from the standpoint of
everyday vocabulary and its use? The children do not score well on
conventional academic verbal tests, even in their home language of
Dholuo. But they do score well on such tests when the words are
used to ask them about indigenous medicines. The same kind of
issue can apply anywhere. Someone may be able to read and
understand the material he or she confronts in everyday life, with
out being able to read the kinds of more difficult passages typically
found on reading tests.
Variation in conceptions of intelligence is found not only outside
the U.S., but inside it as well. We found in a study in San Jose,
California, that Latino parents more emphasized social skills in
their conceptions of intelligence than did Asian and Anglo parents,
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who more emphasized cognitive skills.20 But a child is more likely
to be labeled as having a disability if he or she lacks cognitive skills
than if he or she lacks social skills. Even in the U.S., different
groups have different notions of what constitutes intelligence.

2. Even if one accepts IQs at face value, they are problematical
because they are confounded with verbal and even reading skills.
The large majority of IQ tests involve reading material, or at least
verbal material, which may be presented orally. The comprehen
sion skills needed to understand the material on the IQ test overlap
with the comprehension skills measured by reading tests. For
example, IQ tests often measure vocabulary and reading compre
hension skills. The result is that when reading scores are subtracted
from IQ scores, the subtraction is invalidated by the fact that one is
partly subtracting a thing (verbal-comprehension skills) from itself.
Because both reading scores and IQ scores involve verbal com
ponents, the subtraction cannot give you a pure measure of verbal
or reading skills taking out everything else. The truth is that the
subtraction tells you next to nothing because you do not know how
much of the IQ score was dependent on verbal ability.
The situation becomes even more ridiculous when one includes
a "reasoning deficit" as a learning disability, which Kelman and
Lester report is the case at Stanford University (p. 165). We are
aware of no test of intelligence or academic ability that does not
place heavy emphasis on reasoning. To the extent one views poor
reasoning as a disability, it would be difficult to separate from intel
ligence, especially because definitions of intelligence going back to
Terman generally emphasize the importance of reasoning skills in
intelligence.21

3. Use of nonverbal IQ tests does not solve the problem. In an
effort to get around the problem of verbal content, some psycholo
gists use nonverbal IQ tests, that is, IQ tests that contain no words.
These tests might contain geometric figures on the basis of which
one is supposed to reason. For example, one might be asked to say
which one of five geometric figures does not belong with the other
four.
The test appears to contain no words. But things are not quite
as they appear. The directions are verbal, and some children do not
understand the directions they are given for tests. Solutions of the
problems are also often verbal, as children talk out answers to
themselves. But the greatest problem is that now the IQ test repre
sents an even smaller portion of the full range of intellectual abili20. See Lynn Okagaki & Robert J. Sternberg, Parental Beliefs and Children's School Per
formance, 64 CHILD DEV. 36, 51 (1993).
21. See Lewis M. Terman, Mental Growth and the I.Q., 12 J. Eouc. PsYCHOL. 325-41, 40107 (1921).
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ties, so that to the extent it is supposed to measure all of
intelligence, it is being asked to do something it cannot possibly do.
Reasoning with abstract geometric forms is a far cry from the
kind of intelligence we need to adapt in our everyday lives, and a
test that contains nothing more than such sterile problems cannot
possibly give a complete representation of a person's intelligence.
Such a test should not serve as the basis for a score from which to
subtract a reading score.
4. Difference scores do not mean the same thing at different
points along the IQ spectrum. Imagine, for example, someone who
is a near-genius in abilities overall but who is only above average in
reading abilities. If one views reading disability as defined in terms
of the difference between IQ and reading ability, the near-genius
actually might be classified as having a reading disability. In fact,
the individual's reading ability is way below the individual's overall
abilities, but so what? This is not an individual in whom one would
want to invest any of society's resources so as to bring his or her
reading up to the level of his or her other abilities.
The same problem that can arise at the top of the abilities spec
trum can also arise, with more serious consequences, at the bottom
of the abilities spectrum. Suppose an individual is slightly below
average in general abilities, but way below average in reading. The
difference between the IQ and the reading score, however, does not
quite reach the threshold for classifying the individual as having a
learning disability. Here, someone who really could profit from
special services to improve his or her reading does not get them.
5. Difference scores are extremely unreliable. Indeed, they are
much more unreliable than simple IQ or reading scores.22 What
does this mean?
Imagine a group of individuals taking a test twice. For example,
they might take an IQ test or another ability test twice. To what
extent are their rank orders the second time the same as the first
time? In other words, do the people who do relatively well (or
poorly) the first time also do relatively well (or poorly) the second
time? Reliability measures the extent to which people do about the
same, relative to others, when they are retested.
The more closely related the constructs being measured are, the
more unreliable the difference scores are. Reading ability and
intelligence, or math ability and intelligence, are obviously related.
The relation is far from perfect, but it is not zero either. As a result,
difference scores involving IQ and either reading or math scores
can be expected to be quite unreliable. Schools are thus making
high-stakes decisions on the basis of difference scores that have
22. See Lee J. Cronbach & Lita Furby, How We Should Measure "Change" - or Should
We?, 74 PsYCHOL. BULL. 68, 77-80 (1970).
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been proven to be umeliable bases for making any kind of decision
whatsoever.
Many psychologists and other diagnosticians, of course, know
these facts and feel compelled to use a system that they recognize to
be problematical. Those who do not recognize the problems may
end up contributing to them. But those who do recognize the
problems are caught in an awful bind. They understandably may be
reluctant to report a set of scores that they know will deprive a
child of special services that the child needs. Such a decision is
extremely unpleasant, especially if the school psychologist or other
diagnostician is devoted to his or her work. Or the diagnostician
can administer further tests to the child (such as an additional read
ing test or IQ test) to see if some other combination of test scores
will produce the desired diagnosis.

6. Identification of LDs is plagued by statistical regression.
What is statistical regression?
When prediction is less than perfect, predicted outcomes are
likely to "regress" (move) toward the mean, or the average. Statis
tical regression is not a psychological effect; it is a statistical effect
that arises as an outcome of imperfections of prediction.

In other words, when current data lead one to predict that a
restaurant or an athlete will continue to perform at an above
average level, the performance of the restaurant or athlete will usu
ally get worse over time, all other things equal. Children of really
smart parents tend not to reach their parents' averaged level of
smarts. At the same time, when current data lead one to predict
that a restaurant or an athlete will continue to perform at a below
average level, the performance of the restaurant or athlete will usu
ally get better over time, all other things equal. Children of parents
of very modest abilities tend to excel beyond their parents' aver
aged level of intelligence. The greater the departure of the obser
vations from the mean of the measurements being made, the
greater the amount of statistical regression, that is, the more the
predicted observations tend to regress toward the mean. Thus, re
ally good restaurants show more statistical regression than do just
pretty good ones, and the same holds for really bad restaurants ver
sus just so-so ones.
The reasons for statistical regression are complex and beyond
the scope of this review, but the implications of statistical regression
are very relevant. When there is statistical regression, scores of
individuals tend, on retesting, to be closer, on average, to the mean.
Suppose, for example, that someone does really poorly on a reading
test. Chances are better than fifty-fifty that if the individual is
retested, his or her score will be closer to the mean than the first
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score was. Similarly, if someone does really well, chances are that
the next score will be closer to the mean.
Because diagnoses of reading disabilities are based on very low
reading scores, these diagnoses are susceptible to error because of
problems of statistical regression. Statistical regression can lead to
overdiagnosis because it takes people who just happened to score
very poorly on a reading test one day (relative to an IQ score) and
labels them. If their reading score is much lower than their IQ
score, and their IQ score is closer to the mean than their reading
score, chances are their reading score will regress toward the mean
if the reading test is taken again. Of course, such misdiagnoses can
be reduced by repeated testing rather than just administering a sin
gle test. There are also statistical corrections that can be applied to
help correct for regression effects.
7. Identification processes, particularly with regard to how test
scores are used, differ across states and even across local districts
within states, rendering highly subjective who is labeled as having an
LD. Different states (or even different local school districts) may

have different degrees of discrepancy in what they accept as indica
tive of a learning disability. Or they may use different criteria of
identification altogether. Thus, the easiest way to gain an LD diag
nosis is often to move one's residence, or otherwise to place one's
children in a different school district. Even if one district does not
identify the child as having an LD, another might. Consider some
examples from one state, Connecticut.
The state of Connecticut recently published prevalence rates by
district for students with disabilities in grades K-12.23 It is interest
ing to compare some of the prevalence rates. Hartford is a district
serving a relatively poor population, with a diagnosed prevalence
rate of 17.4%, which is quite high by statewide standards. New
Haven is roughly comparable socioeconomically, but the preva
lence rate is only 12.9%, or roughly three-quarters of that in
Hartford. Almost certainly, the identification procedures differ.
But then, Greenwich, one of the wealthiest towns in the state, has a
prevalence rate of 16.2%, near the top. Another comparable dis
trict, New Canaan, has a prevalence of only 9.5%, and Hebron, an
other well-off district, is down at 7.2%. At the top is Canaan,
largely white and working class, at a whopping 23.8% . Clearly,
standards for identification must differ across districts. A parent
who is dissatisfied with the results for his or her child in one district
may gain a desired diagnosis for his or her child by moving to an
other district.
23. See STAIB DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, DRAFT REPORT ON SPECIAL EDUCATION IN
CoNNEcnCUT (1997).
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Another option besides moving is waiting. In each school year
since 1991-1992, the prevalence rates in special education have
increased. A child who is not identified as having an LD one year
may be identified in a future year, not because the child has
changed, but because the standards of labeling have changed.
In sum, the use of difference scores in diagnosing learning disa
bilities is analogous to the building of a house of cards. Parents and
educators make millions of high-stakes decisions on the basis of a
procedure that is flawed, and moreover, one that any competent
professional in the field ought to realize is in need of modification.
Difference scores are not the only basis on which LD diagnoses
can be made, but they are probably today the most common basis,
despite their glaring inadequacies. It is past time for a change.

IV. THE MATTHEW EFFECT
We believe, on the basis of the various arguments made above,
that IQ has no place at all in the diagnosis of learning disabilities.
For all of the reasons discussed in Part III, diagnoses involving IQ
are badly flawed. Yet such decisions are being made every day, and
children are either receiving or not receiving special services on the
basis of them. Here, as elsewhere, we argue that decisions that
should be based on sound psychological and educational criteria are
being made on the basis of social or even political criteria. Legal
decisions of the kind discussed by Kelman and Lester are being
made every day on the basis of bad psychological and education
practice, such as the use of difference scores described above. A
better practice is to recommend special interventions on the basis of
poor performance in a specified set of skills and then to target the
intervention to the remediation and development of these skills.
Although our greatest concern is with the use of IQ tests, it is
worth pointing out that all tests are nothing more than indicators of
performance at a given time in a given place. Administration of
any test can lead to erroneous judgments, so test scores, whatever
they may be, need to be interpreted carefully. If they are not, they
may lead to what Keith Stanovich has called Matthew effects, based
on a notion introduced by sociologist Robert Merton and adapted
from the Bible, whereby the rich get richer and the poor get
poorer.24 In this context, good learners get better and poorer learn
ers get worse.
24. See Keith E. Stanovich, Matthew Effects in Reading: Some Consequences of Individ
ual Differences in the Acquisition of Literacy, 21 READING REs. Q. 360, 381 (1986) (citing
Robert K. Merton, The Matthew Effect in Science, 159 SCIENCE 56, 58 (1968)); see also
Matthew 13:12 ("For unto every one that hath shall be given, and he shall have abundance:
but from him that hath not shall be taken away even that which he hath.").
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Matthew effects are prevalent in reading instruction because
later skills build so heavily on earlier skills.25 If students are not
given a solid foundation in basic skills, they are scarcely in a posi
tion to acquire more advanced skills. They are like the building
that has a weak foundation and that starts to crumble even as
higher floors are placed on top of lower ones. For example, without
sound word-recognition skills, higher order comprehension is
impossible. It is in part for this reason that many children who are
poor readers show poor phonological-decoding skills in the early
grades and then poor higher order comprehension in the later
grades. They cannot understand meaning when they cannot decode
the words on which the meaning is based.
Matthew effects are pernicious, and they occur throughout our
entire system of education. Once they start, there may be no end to
them. Consider, for example, what happens to the poor reader.
Because of the importance of reading both in the world of school
and in the world of work, schools should do everything they can to
enrich students' reading experiences to the greatest extent possible.
In many schools, however, the poor reader is likely to get a
watered-down program for improving his or her reading skills. The
school, in attempting to give the child "appropriate" reading
material for the child's reading skill level, actually is giving the child
material that may lead him or her to fall behind. For example, giv
ing fifth-grade readers who read on the third-grade level a third
grade reading textbook is a counterproductive strategy. Why? Be
cause the content of the stories is no longer age-appropriate and is
likely to be boring or even demeaning to the fifth-grader. The stu
dent is likely to be unmotivated to read such material. Moreover,
the fifth-grade student is more sophisticated than the third-grade
student in terms of life experience and learning strategies and needs
a pedagogical approach appropriate to his or her age and mental
levels.
Soon, the child getting a watered-down reading program does
start to fall further and further behind in reading. Teachers label
the child "slow" or "incompetent," and then start to expect incom
petent work, which is exactly what they get.
As the years go by, the school system places the child in lower
tracks or receives reduced opportunities in standard tracks. Read
ing performance continues to slide. Eventually the student may
wish to go to college and be required take the Scholastic
Assessment Test (SAT) or the American College Test (ACT). Per
formance on these tests, of course, depends heavily on reading.
Even the mathematical sections require students to read the words
in the problems. The poor reader is likely to do poorly and have a
25. See Stanovich, supra note 24, at 381.

May 1999]

Jumping the Queue

1945

harder time getting into a competitive college, or perhaps any col
lege at all.
Eventually, this student may find him or herself employable
only in menial jobs or in jobs that require little or no specialized
academic training. The reading deficiency now may affect the
whole of the individual's life, not just the individual's performance
in school.
Some parents, recognizing how the system works, compete and
even claw for the educational opportunities they believe their chil
dren deserve, such as extra learning time with specialists or special
arrangements for homework assignments or tests. If their child is
under-performing, they may view special services as the answer.
The only way to get such special services, often, is for their children
to be labeled. As Kelman and Lester recognize, the parents may
see the LD label as the only road available to stop their children
from descending the educational ladder and, ultimately, the social
class ladder.
The worst of it is that the children may only receive the special
services if they have the LD label. This method for allocating
resources creates a perverse situation where parents and often their
children actually may want to be labeled as LD - as having a disa
bility of some kind - in order to qualify for the special services.26
Many individuals to whom we have communicated this fact have
been unwilling to believe that parents would actually want their
children to be labeled as having something wrong with them just so
that they can qualify for special services. But from the parents' own
standpoint, they are acting in a rational way: they have found what
often they believe is the only route to special services for their
children.
We know that poor achievement tends to be associated with
lower socioeconomic status (SES), so we might well expect that di
agnosed incidents of learning disabilities would be high in low-SES
towns, and low in high-SES towns. We might expect such a pattern,
but we would be wrong. In the state of Connecticut, as mentioned
earlier, some of the towns with the highest levels of diagnosed disa
bilities are among the wealthiest towns in the state.27 They are the
towns that, on statewide mastery tests, typically score at or near the
top in terms of levels of academic achievement. How, then, could
these towns have high reported incidences of learning disabilities?
The answer, unfortunately, is that the educational system has
driven these diagnoses. Schools may be conservative in labeling
children as having a disability, but parents do not have to be. Those
26. For a journalistic description of this phenomenon, see Ruth Shalit, Defining Disability
Down, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 25, 1997, at 16.
27. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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parents who are wealthy enough can afford to have a private diag
nostician test their children and, potentially, assign them a label.
Professionals, who are being paid to label, may be reluctant not to
assign the label. If they, like the school, are conservative, they may
find very soon that their client base is drying up. What parents
want to spend as much as several thousand dollars only to be told
that their child is fine and not in need of special services?
So the pressure may be on the diagnostician to give the child the
diagnosis the parent wants. But such a scenario can be played out
only in a town where the parents are wealthy enough to afford one
or more private diagnoses. And the parents may indeed end up
having to shop around for several diagnosticians in search of a diag
nostician willing to make the diagnosis the parents seek. Clearly,
this system is warped, and works against special services going to
those children who arguably need them most, namely, poor chil
dren whose only recourse to special services is through public
schools. Low achievement in school, rather than any kind of special
diagnostic label, is what should trigger special services. Rather than
identifying people as "LD" or "non-LD," we should render special
services for special deficits. The focus should be on labeling defi
cient skills, not people.
What makes this situation bizarre is that parents have been
driven to seek a diagnosis that something is wrong with their child.
In the past, such a diagnosis is probably the last thing most parents
would have wanted for their child.
Schools, of course, can question the private diagnoses they
receive. But in an age where almost anyone seems willing to sue for
almost anything, schools are chary of litigation. They do not want
to get involved in multiple expensive lawsuits where the likelihood
of their losing is fairly substantial. In today's social and legal cli
mate, the system undoubtedly favors those willing to pay for the
diagnoses. Schools have a tremendous incentive to avoid litigation
by giving in to parental demands.
At the same time, we need to recognize that parents are often
driven to have their children diagnosed because they feel desperate
at the lack of resources being devoted to their children. They may
see no other course of action in a system that will pay attention only
if their children are diagnosed. Many outstanding diagnosticians do
their jobs responsibly and well. To the extent a problem exists, it is
not in the parents, diagnosticians, schools, or even the children: it is
in a system that is broken and needs to be fixed.

In sum, we find ourselves basically in agreement with the main
thrust of Jumping the Queue, although we come to similar conclu
sions from different origins. The concept of learning disabilities, as
it is operationalized, does not work. We should not, however,
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throw out the baby with the bath water. We need an operational
ization based simply on poor performance in a given area of
endeavor that a society values without regard to so-called general
intelligence. If the problem is one of skills, the skills need to be
remediated. If the problem is one of motivation then the motiva
tion needs to be remediated. The intervention should fit the partic
ular problem. As a society, we ought to help those whose
performance needs remediation. We should concentrate on per
formances, not on performers. Labeling is useful to the extent it
recognizes school or other work that needs to be improved. At the
same time, we need to recognize that, in a sense, nothing is special
about a learning disability. What is special is the set of skills to
which the society chooses to assign this label. The system we have
in practice finds no basis in psychological theory. To a large extent,
it is a historical accident.

